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In Indonesian history, Britain has never been considered a prominent 
player in the politics of the archipelago. From an Indonesian perspective, 
the British presence only lasted a brief five years (1811–1816) during 
short-lived interregnum regime led by Thomas Stamford Raffles (1781-
1826). This began with the British seizure of Java from the Franco-Dutch 
administration of Marshal Daendels (1808-1811) and his successor, 
General Janssens (May-September 1811), and ended with the formal 
return of the colony to the Netherlands on 19 August 1816. However, as 
this article demonstrates, Britain has had a long-lasting and decisive 
influence on modern Indonesian history, dating from the time when the 
archipelago entered the vortex of global conflict between Britain and Republican France in the 1790s. 
The presence of the British navy in Indonesian waters throughout the century and a half which 
followed Britain’s involvement in the War of the First Coalition (1792-1797) dictated inter alia the 
foundation of new cities like Bandung which grew up along Daendels’ celebrated postweg (military 
postroad), the development of modern Javanese cartography, and even the fate of the exiled Java War 
leader, Prince Diponegoro, in distant Sulawesi (1830-1855). As witnessed in the 20th century, the 
existence of the Dutch as colonial masters in the Indonesian Archipelago was critically dependent on 
the naval defence screen provided by the British. When the British lost their major battleships (Prince 
of Wales and Repulse) to Japanese attack off the east coast of Malaya on 10 December 1941 and 
Singapore fell on 15 February 1942, the fate of the Dutch East Indies was sealed. Today, the vital role 
played by the Royal Navy in guaranteeing the archipelago’s security up to February 1942 has been 
replaced by that of the Honolulu-based US Seventh Fleet but the paradoxes of such protection have 
continued. 
 





During the century and a half which stretched from the declaration of war on Britain by the French 
Republic on 1 February 1793 to the Battle of the Java Sea on 27 February 1942, British naval power 
was key to the defence of what would become—post-December 1818, called the Netherlands East 
Indies and—post-1945, called Indonesia. Operating initially from its bases in Madras (Chennai) and 
Penang (Georgetown) and subsequently from Singapore (post-1819)—later (1921–1941) a major 
base for the Royal Navy—the United Kingdom controlled naval access to Indonesia, thus providing 
a vital security screen for the vast Dutch colony. Post-war World, this screen would be provided by 
the immense power of the United States (US) Seventh Fleet which had replaced the Royal Navy 
following its naval victories over Japan at the battles of the Coral Sea (4–8 May 1942) and Midway 
(4–7 June 1942). The present article at the implications of this British security screen for political 
developments in the Dutch East Indies/Indonesia in the century and a half from the 1790s to the 
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Dutch unconditional surrender to the Japanese on 8 March 1942 at Kalijati (Subang) following their 
lightning conquest of the archipelago.  
From January 1793, when it entered the War of the First Coalition (1792–1797) against 
Republican France to the Battle of Waterloo on 18 June 1815, the United Kingdom was engaged in 
a global conflict which only ended with the final defeat of Napoleon. This was both a military and an 
ideological conflict akin to the Cold War (1947–1991), which split the post-war world into 
Communist and anti-Communist (Liberal Democratic) camps, or the anti-fascist struggle between 
the Allies and the totalitarian states (Germany, Italy, Japan) in World War II. If Britain and her allies 
had not prevailed militarily and ideologically during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, which 
in the view of the present authors were the first truly global conflicts of the modern era, the world (at 
least the European and Atlantic worlds) would have been very different. Time-hallowed hereditary 
and monarchical principles would have been overturned in favour of a republican political format and 
the British monarchy abolished along with the British aristocracy and pre-Revolutionary—ancien 
régime—landholding systems and inheritance based on primogeniture. These would have been 
replaced by universal property rights legislated in the Napoleonic Code (1804), thus doing away with 
privilege based on birth in favour of a Republican meritocracy. In international terms, France would 
have replaced Britain as the dominant power in Western Europe and the Atlantic with the recently 
established Republic of the United States becoming a French client state and almost certainly, like 
Quebec, francophone.  
There were thus hugely important strategic and political issues at stake in this conflict for 
Britain. It was a conflict she had to win in order to preserve her position as the world’s leading 
commercial power, the apogee of which occurred precisely in this half-century between 1780 and 
1830 as British History, Chris Bayly, argued in his Imperial Meridian (1989) rather than later during 
the Victorian imperial era, 1837–1901, as the popular version of Britain’s imperial history would have 
it. 
How does the Netherlands East Indies fit into this? Surely these European and trans-Atlantic 
conflicts had little impact on distant Southeast Asia? Unfortunately, this was not the case. The 
successful French invasion of the Netherlands in the winter of 1794/1795, had ensured that Java and 
the eastern archipelago had become part of that wider global struggle. This was because the Dutch 
Republic—now rechristened the Batavian Republic (1795–1806) following the French military 
takeover—had become a client state of Revolutionary France. It was this French-controlled Republic 
which had assumed control of the assets of the now-bankrupt (1798) and defunct (1799) Dutch East 
India Company (Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie, VOC), a takeover contested by the former 
Dutch Head of State (Stadhouder), Prince Willem V of Orange (r. 1751–1806). On 18 January 1795 
as French troops closed in on his capital, The Hague, he had fled into exile in London, and, from the 
Palace in what is now the borough of Richmond-on-Thames, made available to him by the British 
monarch, George III (r. 1760–1820), he had issued the so-called ‘Kew Letters’ (30 January–8 
February 1795) ordering the heads of Dutch trading posts and possessions east of the Cape of Good 
Hope to hand those posts over to the British rather than allow them to fall into French hands. In this 
way, Java and the Dutch possessions in the outer islands (Ambon, Seram, Makassar, Manado, Padang 
etc.) became involved in the ongoing global struggle between France and Britain. 
British naval operations in Indonesian waters began in earnest in late 1795 and early 1796, 
when a fleet under the command of Commodore Peter Rainier (1741–1808), Commander-in-Chief 
of the East Indies Station (1794–1805), swept through Indonesia capturing most of the Dutch 
possessions outside Java. The highpoint of Rainier’s naval operations against the VOC took place on 
23 August 1800, when his squadron of just three frigates and one ship-of-the-line, HMS Centurion, 
a 50-gun Salisbury Class Fourth Rate battleship, entered the roads of Batavia, and captured five Dutch 
armed vessels and 22 merchantmen some of which were taken as a prize to Penang. Although all the 
Dutch possessions outside Java barring Ceylon (post-1972 Sri Lanka) and Cape Colony (South 
Africa) were returned to the Dutch at the Treaty of Amiens (27 March 1802), they were swiftly 
recaptured after general hostilities broke out again the following year (18 May 1803) (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1. 'View of the Island of Banda Neira Captured by a force landed from a squadron under the 
command of Captain [Christopher] Cole on the morning of 9th August 1810’ (Lithograph by Longman, 
Hurst, Rees & Brown, 16 October 1811), aquatint 43 x 58 cm. Photo courtesy of the National Maritime 
Museum, Greenwich, London. 
 
After Rainier’s departure in 1805, and his replacement first by Nelson’s line captain, Rear-
Admiral Sir Thomas Troubridge (1760–1807; in post, 1805–1807), and then by Troubridge’s 
deputy, Rear-Admiral Sir Edward Pellew (post-1816, Lord Exmouth, 1757–1833; in post 1804–
1809), the situation in Java became a strategic priority for Britain. During the three and a half years 
of Marshal Herman Willem Daendels’ administration (1808–1811), when the island was fortified as 
a French military base in the Indian Ocean, Britain’s position in India and its control of her maritime 
trade routes to China via the Melaka Straits began to come under threat. It was for this reason that 
the Governor-General of Bengal, Lord Minto (in office, 1807–1813), was instructed in 1809 by the 
British Government and the British East India Company (EIC) Directors to eject the French from 
all their posts and fortified strongpoints in the Indian Ocean, including Réunion (Île de Bourbon), 
Mauritius (Île de France), and Java. These were all captured by British amphibious operations—
namely, a combination of British naval power (Figure 2) and Indian and British army expeditionary 
troops (Figure 3)—in 1809, 1810, and 1811 respectively. 
Once the Franco-Dutch forces had been defeated in Java with the capitulation of Daendels’ 
hapless successor, Lieutenant-General Jan Willem Janssens (in office, May–September 1811), at kali 
(river) Tuntang between Ungaran and Salatiga on 18 September 1811, the pressure was on Raffles 
and Minto to start scaling back the British military establishment. This was more than halved in the 
months following the August–September 1811 Java campaign from around 11,000 at the time of the 
initial invasion to just 5,000 troops, mostly Sepoy battalions, who were involved in garrison duties in 
the key towns of the archipelago. Nearly all the British infantry line regiments and specialist troops 
(engineers, field artillery, etc.) were shipped back to Bengal and Europe in order to reduce the military 
establishment costs and free up troops for other theatres of war during the final campaigns against 
Napoleon (Thorn 1815; Carey 1992, 432-33 n.164; Glendinning 2012, 133-34).  
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Figure 2. Boats of His Majesty's Sloop Procris (Captain Robert Maunsell) attacking and capturing six French 
gunboats off the coast of Java at Indramayu on 31 July 1811. Engraving by Charles Rosenberg (flourished 
mid-19th century) after a painting by the celebrated naval artist, William John Huggins (1781–1845). Oil 
on canvas, 71 x 106.5 cm. Photograph by courtesy of the National Maritime Museum, London. 
 
 
Figure 3. A grenadier sepoy, a member of one of the Bengal volunteer battalions which took part in 
the British invasion of Java in August-September 1811 and the subsequent attack on Yogyakarta, 20 June 
1812. Aquatint by William Daniell (1769–1837) from John Williams, An historical account of the rise and 
progress of the Bengal native infantry from its first formation in 1757 to 1796 (London: John Murray, 
1817), p. 171 facing. 
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Given the need for severe economies and the subsequent reduction of the British military 
establishment on Java in particular, it was important that potential threats from local rulers with 
substantial military forces at their disposal were eliminated. This led to operations undertaken by 
Raffles and his army commanders–Colonel (post-January 1812, Major-General) Robert Rollo 
Gillespie (1766–1814; in post, 1811–1813), Major-General Sir Miles Nightingall (1768–1829; in 
post, 1813–1815) and Colonel Nathaniel Burslem (c. 1770–1856; in post, 1815–1816)—against 
local rulers outside Java such as the Sultan of Palembang (March 1812), the raja of Bali Buleleng 
(May 1814) and the Sultan of Boné (June 1814). But the most important military establishment 
independent of the colonial government lay in south-central Java. This belonged to the Sultanate of 
Yogyakarta. Writing in early 1812 after his first bruising encounter with the Second Sultan on 23 
December 1811, when he had come within an ace of being killed, Raffles reckoned that the Yogya 
ruler was ‘the main power in the eastern outlying districts’, and, if the European power was 
withdrawn, the Surakarta ruler—Pakubuwono IV (r. 1788–1820)—would be unable to maintain his 
authority and the sultan’s power ‘would [then] at once extend over the whole of the eastern districts 
of Java including the sea coasts’ (Carey 2008, 159–60).  
This threat could only be eliminated if the Second Sultan was removed. This happened 
following the 20 June 1812 assault on Yogyakarta which Raffles attacked with 1,200 picked troops 
(mainly British Indian sepoys from the Bengal and Madras Presidencies). Following the successful 
three-hour operation which took place between five and eight o’clock in the morning, Raffles could 
announce to his patron, Lord Minto, in Kolkata that “the European power is for the first time 
paramount in Java. […] we never till this moment could call ourselves masters of the more valuable 
provinces in the interior, nay, our possessions on the sea coasts would always have been precarious 
and, had [our] military force been materially reduced, much eventual danger was to be apprehended” 
(Carey 2008, 342–43).  
Thus there was a dynamic and logic to British military actions during their five-year occupation 
of Java at the end of the Napoleonic Wars. It was not just a question of a show of force on the part of 
the colonial government designed to inspire shock and awe. Instead, the Sultan was targetted precisely 
because he represented a threat to the very existence of the colonial power in Java since his military 
assets, if used offensively, could jeopardise the British position on the north coast of Java. At the same 
time, the plundering of the Yogyakarta court also had a logic to it in that this was one of the ways in 
which British Indian Sepoy troops were rewarded for battlefield operations. In India, booty was one 
of the major perquisites of East India Company officers [‘loot’ is derived from the Hindi word ‘lut’, 
meaning ‘spoil, booty, or plunder’] and the British army there had fought for the right to keep 
everything in fortresses, courts and strong points taken by assault (Carey 2008, 466). 
 
Some Strategic Implications of the British Naval Presence in Indonesian Waters, 1808–1833 
 
Bandung and the postweg (1809–1810) 
When Marshal Herman Willem Daendels arrived in Java on 6 January 1808, he found the island 
under siege. So rigorous was the Royal Navy’s blockade of Java’s north coast ports that nothing could 
move along the north coast without attracting the guns of Rear-Admiral Sir Edward Pellew’s Indian 
Ocean squadron. But Daendels thought big. If a coastal highway was strategically impossible, he 
would use gunpowder to blast a new mountain road through the Priangan Highlands via Puncak 
(Megamendung, Figure 4). This led to the foundation on 25 September 1810 of an entirely new 
regional capital—Bandung—when Daendels ordered the removal of the seat of the local government 
(kabupaten) from Dayeuh Kolot to the eastern bank of the kali (river) Cikapundung (Katam and 
Abadi 2006, 2).  
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Figure 4. Megamendung Pass by Raden Saleh Syarif Bustaman (c. 1811–1880), 1862, oil on canvas, 90 x 53 
cm. Private Collection Indonesia. 
 
Daendels’s great trans-Java post road (postweg) was built (1809–1810): “no governor had 
thought of it before him, and I believe none will dare to contemplate it afterwards” (“aucun 
gouverneur n’y avoit pensé avant lui et je crois qu’aucun n’auroit osé penser après”) was the Belgian 
officer, Major Éduard Errembault de Dudzeele’s (1789–1830), pithy summation of the project’s sheer 
scale when he travelled the road during the Java War (1825–1830) (Carey 2021, 36 n. 10).  
Daendels’s governorship was not just about roads. It also laid the foundation for the 
administrative centralization of the Netherlands Indies and post-1945 Indonesia, thus changing 
forever the relationship between the colonial government in Batavia and the Javanese. Tasked by King 
Louis of Holland (r. 1806–1810) with sweeping powers to reform the corrupt administration of the 
former Dutch East India Company (VOC) (9 February 1807) and elevated to the highest military 
rank as Marshal of Holland (Maarschalk van Holland) (28 January 1807), to ensure Java’s defence 
against the British, Daendels’s 41-month tenure as colonial viceroy left a lasting legacy. He was not 
in the business of reforming a few archaic practices, a little tinkering at the edges to bring the old 
Dutch East India Company into the modern world. He wanted root-and-branch change. His 
administration transformed the political and social world of Java. In everything that touched the 
relationship between south-central Javanese courts—Yogyakarta and Surakarta—and Batavia, from 
the political demands of the colonial administration, to access to labour and economic resources, to 
new notions of status, and military and defence requirements in an era of global conflict, it was clear 
that Java had entered a new age. Like a depth charge, the impact of Daendels’s presence would be felt 
long after his mid-May 1811 departure. 
Although based on shaky military foundations, the marshal’s administration drew a line under 
the previous Company (VOC) era. The existence of his new military road—the postweg—marked 
the beginning of an integrated modern Java whose transport system. This ran west-east by land along 
the north coast rather than, as previously, north-south following the major rivers connecting the coast 
and the interior. Nas and Pratiwo (2002, 721) have reminded us that ‘traditional Javanese life is 
expressed in its urban form by its orientation towards the mountain and the river’. Once the postweg 
was constructed, however, it replaced the rivers as the main economic artery. Cosmological notions 
changed drastically: 
 
“The Chinese did not build their new temples at the riverside anymore, but on the postweg. 
They perceived the postweg as the new ‘breath of life’. The [modern] temple in Lasem built 
in the twentieth century was not oriented towards the Lasem River, as was the case with the 
old temple, but faced the grote postweg. A similar change occurred with the ‘palaces’ [sic, 
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dalem = residences] of the regents built [along the posting road] in the mid-nineteenth 
century.” (Nas and Pratiwo 2002, 722) 
 
Over time the grote postweg became one prolonged urbanized area. Java along with the 400-
kilometre arc of the Kantō plain between Osaka and Tokyo in Japan, developed into one of the most 
densely populated regions in the world. In Nas and Pratiwo’s words, ‘one could call Java the longest 
city in the world with the grote postweg as its main transport and economic artery’ (Nas and Pratiwo 
2002, 721). While what remains today of the postweg is almost obliterated by Java’s urban sprawl, it 
did not start out that way. In fact, the use of the new trans-Java highway was heavily restricted at least 
until 1857. Only then was it opened to general traffic. Not only was it a military road, but it was also 
a posting road built for the fast delivery of government dispatches and European personnel. Anyone 
using it needed official permission (Kraus and Vogelsang 2012, 98). Indeed, the road was not 
accessible to Javanese vehicles which had to use special carting roads that ran alongside the postweg. 
Until 1857, it was only for Dutch carriages equipped with the requisite coachmen and footmen. In 
Kraus’s words, “when a colonial officer travelled along this road in an official capacity, it was more 
than just a journey it was a demonstration of colonial power” (Kraus and Vogelsang 2012, 69). Such 
impressions were also evidenced in Major Errembault’s Java War diary and by non-Dutch witnesses 
writing in the mid-nineteenth century (Carey 2021, 41). 
 
 
Figure 5.John Walker’s (1759–1830) map of Java published in Raffles History of Java (1817). The most 
detailed every produced up to that point in time, it showed all the mineral and natural resources of Java as 
well as landing places on the south coast—in particular Pelabuhan Ratu (Wijnkoops Bay), Cilacap and 
Pacitan—where amphibious forces could be disembarked in the event that the British had to reconquer Java 
from the Dutch following the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815.  
 
Before Raffles departed from Java on 30 March 1816 at the end of his five-year period as 
Lieutenant-Governor, he oversaw the collection of detailed data on the natural resources of Java and 
its topography. This was for strategic as much as for scholarly purposes. The modern colonial project 
put a high value on the accumulation of knowledge and data on colonised territories. Knowledge was 
power. It facilitated the business of government and also highlighted the natural resources which 
could be exploited in the event that Java had been retained as a Crown Colony by the British as Raffles 
hoped. In the case of the exceptionally detailed map compiled for Raffles by the British cartographer, 
John Walker, there is important additional topographical information with inset maps the major 
anchorages and bays with depth soundings marked, and even a mineralogical sketch of the island 
compiled in 1812 by Thomas Horsfield (1773–1859), the American naturalist and friend of Raffles. 
Disappointed that Java had not been made a Crown Colony and retained as a British possession after 
the end of the Napoleonic Wars (1799–1815), Raffles determined that he should compile the 
requisite information to enable a subsequent British invasion of Java from the south coast in the event 
that this became necessary because of a confrontation with the Netherlands in Europe. This, in fact, 
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occurred just four years after Raffles’ death (5 July 1826) when the Southern Netherlands rose in 
revolt against the Dutch (25 August 1830–12 August 1831) and received the support of the great 
powers of Europe (Great Britain, Russia, France and Prussia) to establish itself as an independent 
country—Belgium—with its own monarch, Leopold of Saxe-Coburg (1790–1865), who reigned as 
Leopold I of the Belgians (1831–1865). We will see in the next section how these hostilities over 
Belgian independence impacted the fate of the recently exiled Prince Diponegoro (1785–1855) and 
his family in distant Manado (1830–1833). 
 
 
Figure 6. Diponegoro’s journey into exile in Manado (1830–1833) on the corvette Pollux (4-5-1830–12-6-
1830) and his subsequent voyage to Makassar (1833–1855) on the sailing sloop Circe (20-6-1833–11-7-
1833). Map drawn by J. Wilbur Wright of Oxford. 
 
The events which took place in Europe had a direct impact on the conditions under which 
Diponegoro and his family were held in exile in Sulawesi (Celebes). This was because of the Dutch 
feared that the British would use their naval power and overrun Dutch possessions in the Outer 
Islands as they had done in the late 1790s and late 1800s (Figure 1).  
Although Belgian independence had been proclaimed (4 October 1830), and Leopold of Saxe-
Coburg elevated as the new Belgian monarch (21 July 1831, r. 1831–1865), the Dutch king, Willem 
I (r. 1813–1840), had refused to disarm (he later abdicated as Dutch monarch shortly after Dutch 
recognition of Belgian independence at the Treaty of London on 19 April 1839). A series of military 
engagements had ensued which eventually led to a French army entering Belgium in support of the 
Belgian nationalist forces and bombarding the citadel of Antwerp where a Dutch garrison under 
General David Hendrik Chassé (1765–1849) eventually surrendered after a heroic two-year siege 
(December 1832). In early 1833, it seemed that the French might even cross the Dutch-Belgian 
border into Zeeland. With a European war looming, Johannes van den Bosch (in office as Governor 
[post-1832 Commissioner]-General, 1830–1834) became seriously alarmed that ‘an unscrupulous 
enemy’—by which he clearly meant the British—might seek to use the large numbers of political 
exiles in the ‘outer possessions’ for political purposes. In particular, he was concerned that Diponegoro 
might take advantage of the opportunity of a new European conflict to escape and return to Java to 
lead a new rebellion (Carey 2008, 735). It was clearly inappropriate for him to remain in the town of 
Manado close to the shipping routes where British naval forces might reappear at any moment to 
repeat their previous 1795–1797 and 1808–1810 amphibious operations when nearly all the Dutch 
outer island possessions had fallen into their hands.  
The former Resident of Manado, Daniel François Willem Pietermaat (1790–1848; in office, 
1827–1831) was delegated to leave his post at the High Court in Batavia and return immediately to 
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Manado to arrange for Diponegoro’s transfer to a newly constructed strongpoint deep in the 
Minahasan interior. Once in Manado, however, Pietermaat soon realised that Van den Bosch’s 
proposals were impractical. The Dutch East Indies Government had no legal sovereignty in Minahasa. 
Its authority depended on a contract with the local chiefs dating back to 1810, but this gave them no 
rights over land. Without the permission of the local authorities no fort could be built in the interior. 
Besides, none of the chiefs, in Pietermaat’s view, would believe that such a strongpoint was being 
constructed only to house an ‘unimportant person’ like Diponegoro. They would suspect that it was 
a move by the government in the direction of outright annexation and they would resist it. If it came 
to war, what could a garrison of forty Dutch and native troops in Manado do against a hostile 
Minahasan population of 80,000? Furthermore, the British were well liked in Minahasa: during the 
period of their rule (1811–1817), they had treated the population well giving lavish presents to the 
local chiefs and demanding no forced deliveries or personal labour services from the peasant 
cultivators. If they landed with a strong force of marines, as they had done when they had taken in 
Banda in August 1810 (Figure 1), they would be welcomed with open arms. An alternative strategy 
would have to be found.  
One such alternative actively canvassed by Van den Bosch both during his period as 
commissioner-general (1832–1834) and as minister of the colonies (1834–1839), was to send 
Diponegoro, along with other prominent Indonesian exiles, back to the Netherlands. His suggestion 
was that they should be held in one of the royal fortresses which served as state prisons for members 
of the Dutch elite, such as Loevestein in Gelderland and Woerden in the province of Utrecht. All the 
costs would be met by the Indies exchequer, meaning, in Diponegoro’s case, the Yogyakarta court. If 
Diponegoro had rejected Tondano with its 69 degree Fahrenheit mean early morning temperature as 
too cold, no leap of the imagination is necessary to contemplate how many Dutch winters he would 
have survived in the damp fortresses of the New Dutch ‘water line’ (Nieuwe Hollandse waterlinie) 
frontier defence system. It was fortunate for the prince that the Dutch king rejected Van den Bosch’s 
proposal out of hand as politically unacceptable (Carey 2008, 735–6). Indeed, it would not be until 
the early twentieth century that Indonesian exiles were sent back to the Netherlands and then as in-
country detainees rather than as state prisoners incarcerated in royal fortresses. 
With his plans to transfer Diponegoro to the Netherlands finding little favour, Van den Bosch 
hit on an Indies alternative. The prince would be moved south in deepest secrecy to Makassar where 
he would be held until his dying breath in Admiral Cornelis Janszoon Speelman’s (1628–1684) great 
stronghold of Fort Rotterdam. Instead of Manado’s puny 40-strong garrison, the south Sulawesi 
fortress boasted a complement of 200 soldiers and powerful gun batteries mounted on its five great 
bastions which covered all the approaches from sea and land. It was altogether a more formidable 
defensive structure. In this way, Diponegoro and his followers would exchange Fort New Amsterdam 
for Fort Rotterdam travelling the length of the Dutch eastern Indonesian gulag by naval schooner, a 
clandestine twenty-one days (20 June–11 July 1833) odyssey (Figure 6) made all the more poignant 
by the name of the vessel tasked with transporting them, the Circe, styled after the queen goddess in 
Homer’s epic who could transform men into animals.  
Van den Bosch went to enormous lengths to ensure that even the local Dutch authorities in 
Manado were not informed of Diponegoro’s true destination. The Acting (post-1834, official) 
Resident of Manado, Joan Pieter Cornelis Cambier (in office, 1831–1842), was to be told that the 
prince was bound for Ternate. Meanwhile, the schooner’s captain was only to be instructed to hold 
course for Makassar when he had cleared the roads of Manado. On reaching Makassar on 11 July 
1833, the ship’s officers were sworn to secrecy and forbidden to enter into any correspondence 
regarding their voyage. The ship’s log was altered and immediately after depositing the prince and his 
party, it sailed to Ambon making it look as though the Moluccas (Maluku) had been its original 
destination all along. On arrival in Ambon, the captain was relieved of any obligation to report his 
movements to the local Dutch authorities in Fort Victoria (Carey 2008, 738). But, even these strict 
instructions seem to have been of little avail in preventing the schooner’s Indonesian sailors from 
reacting badly to the former Java War leader’s presence in their midst. Jan Izaäk van Sevenhoven (in 
office, 1832–1839), who served as a member of the Raad van Indië (Council of the Indies), would 
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later advise that Diponegoro should never again be moved by a Dutch warship given the possibility 
of mutiny amongst the ship’s crew. Any further transfers should be by ‘colonial trader’, namely by 
ordinary merchantman (Carey 2008, 739). 
 
The Paradoxes of Protection (1795–1833) and the Establishment of Singapore (1819) 
The saga of Diponegoro’s secret transfer from Manado to Makassar in June–July 1833 highlights the 
paradox of British naval power in Southeast Asia for the Dutch. On the one hand, the presence of the 
Royal Navy in Indonesian waters was a guarantor of Dutch security from the threat of foreign 
seaborne invasion. Such threats had occurred as recently as the American Revolutionary War (1775–
1782) when the French Indian Ocean Squadron, commanded by its famous admiral, the Bailli de 
Suffren (1729–1788; in post, 1782–1784), had caused the VOC Supreme Government (Hoge 
Regeering) in Batavia to request naval assets from Holland and put the city garrison on high alert. It 
happened again in 1793–1794 during the early period of the French Revolutionary Wars (1792–
1799) when French warships had sailed into the Bay of Batavia and threatened the VOC dockyards 
on Pulau Onrust (Carey 2010, 168; Zandvliet 1991, 79–80).  
With the formal mandate received from the exiled Stadhouder, Willem V (r. 1751–1806), 
through his 30 January–8 February 1795 ‘Kew Letters’, the British were quick to establish themselves 
as the dominant naval power in Indonesian waters, a process which had already begun following their 
decisive victory over the Dutch in the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War (1780–1784) when British ships had 
been given free navigation of the archipelago seas (Ken 1978, 51). Incursions by French warships on 
the scale seen in the 1780s and early 1790s became a thing of the past. But this did not mean that the 
Dutch could now enjoy all the benefits without any of the inconveniences of relying on the world’s 
then superpower to ensure their maritime security.  
The example of the exiled Diponegoro in distant Manado underscored the dangers which might 
arise if the Dutch fell out with the British over issues of European politics. The Dutch king, Willem 
I’s (r. 1813–1840), refusal to accept the fact of Belgian independence put the Netherlands directly 
athwart British foreign policy. It also meant that if the British or post-1945, the Americans, whose 
Honolulu-based Seventh Fleet had replaced the Royal Navy’s Singapore-China Station squadron as 
the guarantor of the maritime security of the Dutch East Indies/Indonesia in the aftermath of World 
War II, there was very little that the Dutch, or post-1949, the newly independent Indonesian 
government could do about it. During the Java War (1825–1830) and again before the onset of the 
Aceh War (1873–1904), it was strongly suspected that the British and Chinese merchants operating 
out of Penang and Singapore were providing weapons to Holland’s local Indonesian opponents in 
south-central Java and Banda Aceh. But, because the British dominated the sea lanes through the 
archipelago, the Dutch could not mount an effective seaborne operation to prevent the smuggling 
trade in arms and munitions to Diponegoro’s forces. 
During Raffles’ five-year incumbency as Lieutenant-Governor of Java (1811–1816), it is 
evident that he was aware of the strategic importance of the two key straits which bisected the 
archipelago, namely the Straits of Melaka and the Straits of Sunda. Indeed, following the fall of 
Daendels’ great redoubt at Meester Cornelis (Jatinegara) on 26 August 1811, he reported to Minto 
that stone from Daendels’ fortress was being shipped off to build the new defences at Muntok 
(present-day Mentok) on the island of Bangka. This guarded the sea approaches to Palembang along 
the Musi River as well as the strategic Bangka Straits and adjacent tin mines on Bangka and Belitung 
(Carey 2008, 345). Belitung, in particular, was deemed so strategically important to Raffles that he 
persuaded London via Minto to lay formal claim to it in 1812 and retain it as a British possession 
after the return of Java to the Dutch on 19 August 1816. It was only given back to the Netherlands 
in 1824 under the terms of the 17 March Treaty of London which made a formal division of Dutch 
and Netherlands possessions in the archipelago, with the British exchanging Bengkulu (Bencoolen) 
for Melaka and British rights over Singapore (1819) being recognised (Heidhues 1991, 2).  
Singapore may have been strategically well situated but it had its own navigational challenges 
as Leonard Andaya has recently pointed out that the seas to the south of Singapore were noted for 
their coral-fringed islands, and their treacherous winds and currents, not to speak of piracies by the 
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local inhabitants [Orang Laut] (Andaya 2021). This remained a navigational challenge until well into 
the nineteenth century when ‘piracy’ was suppressed by British naval gunboats and Admiralty 
hydrographers began charting these waters in a systematic way and accurate Admiralty charts became 
available. Singapore had been among the most important of the Orang Laut (seafaring ethnic groups) 
bases because of its strategic position in the international east-west maritime trade route and they 
remained important until well into the subsequent British period. In Andaya’s words, it was not until 
officials of the British East India Company decided to transform Singapore into an important node 
in its seaborne empire as a rival to the Dutch in Batavia in the early decades of the nineteenth century 
that Singapore gradually became transformed into a prominent port city and eventually a global city-
state serving not only the negara selat but also the seven seas far beyond SE Asia (Andaya 2021). 
The small settlement founded by Raffles in 1819 and declared a free port in 1822, grew rapidly. 
Strategically placed to eclipse Batavia as a major entrepot servicing the India-China trade, by 1825 
just six years after its foundation and a year after it had become a Crown Colony, its population had 
passed 10,000 and the volume of trade was worth 22 million Spanish dollars (USD 6.400.000 in 
present-day [2020] money). This was nearly three times that of Penang (8.5 million Spanish dollars) 
founded forty years previously (1785). Given these statistics, it is no surprise that when the Straits 
Settlements colony, which initially comprised Penang, Melaka and Singapore (the coaling station of 
Labuan in Borneo was added in 1846) was founded in 1826. Singapore soon took over the mantle of 
Penang as the colony’s capital (1832). By this time, the volume of trade passing through its port had 
reached nearly 30 million Spanish dollars (USD 8.500.000 in present-day [2020] money) (Ken 1978, 
53).  
Singapore was now regarded as a possible point d’appui where British merchants might load 
tea from China brought down by Chinese junks in exchange for opium and British manufactures, 
and become a possible port of retreat should the Chinese make it impossible to trade in Canton (Ken 
1978, 53). Although Singapore’s development as a major naval base servicing the China Station fleet 
was still nearly a century distant (1921–1941), by the third decade of the nineteenth century British 
naval dominance of the archipelago seas was absolute. By this time, Batavia, once seen in the 




During the first half of the 20th century, the Indonesian/Indies archipelago again felt the decisive 
influence of the British Navy on its political situation. This period saw three stages of political-
economic change which determined the fate not just of the archipelago but the entire world—namely, 
the First World War (1914–1918), the interwar crisis (1918–1939), and the Second World War 
(1939–1945). The Dutch East Indies was affected by all three of these at various levels of intensity.  
The First World War did not present an immediate danger of war to the Indies. Since the 
Netherlands experienced the bitter loss of its southern region—Belgium—in the Belgian 
Revolutionary War (1830–31), the kingdom and its empire had distanced itself from the European 
political arena by pursuing a neutral foreign policy whose guiding principle was ‘aloofness’ 
(Bussemaker 2000, 115). For more than a century from the Dutch return in August 1816 until the 
end of the First World War (1918), this principle succeeded in protecting the country and its colonies 
from the devastation of war. However, this did not mean that the Dutch East Indies was completely 
spared collateral effects of the First World War. Throughout the war, there were blockades, espionage, 
and naval battles between the Allied and Axis powers. These hostilities caused major communication 
disruptions and hampered sea transportation to and from Europe. 
The Netherlands was no exception here. Communication between the colonial government in 
Batavia and the mother country could not be done by electronic communication because such 
telegrams were often garbled. Therefore, the only way of communication was through typed 
correspondence which could often take months. In facilitating this relationship between the 
Netherlands and its vast Asian colony, the British Navy also played a significant role. The Netherlands 
and its colonies were dependent on the sea routes patrolled by the Royal Navy which alone had the 
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capacity to repel or blockade the German naval assets and land forces. Furthermore, Britain also 
frequently restricted neutral shipping between the Indies and Europe in order to abort the so-called 
‘Indo-German plan’ which had assigned the Dutch East Indies a key role in the overthrow of British 
power in the Far East (Dijk 2007, xi). In practice, the Indies were left to its own policymaking devices 
in cases that required speedy resolution. 
The success of its foreign policy of neutrality and ‘aloofness’ during the First World War has 
made the Netherlands optimistic about maintaining this principle as tensions escalated in the run-up 
to the Second World War. This was the case both with Germany versus the Netherlands in Europe 
and Japan against the Dutch East Indies in Asia (Foray 2007, 51). For the colonial government in 
Batavia, this principle meant that it was not necessary to prepare for military attacks from foreign 
powers. This confidence was reinforced by the results of the Washington Naval Conference (WNC) 
in 12 November 1921-6 February 1922, which was signed by four victorious powers with major naval 
forces in the aftermath of World War I—namely, the United States, Great Britain, France, and Japan. 
This guaranteed the territorial integrity of the possessions of each signatory. Similar recognition was 
given by each country to the Dutch in the post-conference memorandum of 6 February 1922 
(Bussemaker 2000, 115). However, this provision would only truly secure the possessions of the 
Dutch empire if the four great powers remained loyal allies. 
However, the outcome of the Washington Conference was not what the Western signatories 
had hoped. Japan was completely dissatisfied with the 1921 provisions of the Conference and even 
more dissatisfied with a similar meeting in London in 1930 (London Naval Treaty I) at which the 
Japanese Navy was limited to only two-thirds of the equivalent navies of the US and Britain (Kurasawa 
2016, 2). At this point, Japan’s alliance with the Allied countries began to crumble. Indeed, it soon 
became clear that Japan had its own plans for the Dutch East Indies.  
Since the 1930s, the danger of an attack coming from Japan had begun to be recognised by the 
Dutch and caused particular concern in Batavia. Given the lack of military preparation in the Indies, 
the only safeguard for the continuing security of the archipelago was the defence screen provided by 
the still powerful British Navy operating from its Singapore, Ceylon (Trincomalee), and Indian naval 
bases (Bombay Naval Dockyard and Kidderpore docks, Kolkata). Reflecting on this, an Anglo-Dutch 
military alliance and cooperation in Asia would seem to be a natural outcome. After all, both countries 
had lucrative Southeast Asian colonies and there was an interest in protecting them from Japanese 
attack (Bussemaker 2000, 117). However, both the Dutch cabinet in Europe and the Dutch East 
Indies colonial government still adhered to the principle of neutrality—hoping against hope that 
Japan would not intervene militarily in the Indies. But, given Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931 
and ever-increasing tensions between the US and Japan, this was a forlorn hope. Moreover, the US 
was Japan’s most important source of oil and bunkering fuel for the Japanese navy. This meant that 
Dutch hopes that Japan would spare the Indies from attack was more like whistling in the dark than 
a serious foreign policy option (Ong Hok Ham 1987, 11–12). In particular, Japanese industry was 
heavily dependent on imported oil supplies from the US and the Middle East. The conflict with the 
US would force Japan to seek new sources of oil—to Central Asia or the Indies. Thus, the real danger 
of Japanese invasion could not be avoided unless the Dutch East Indies were willing to meet Japanese 
war needs, something which was simply not possible given its principle of neutrality. 
The only sensible option the Dutch had in Asia was to make an alliance with Britain. This was 
the choice of Holland’s long-serving prime minister, Hendrik Colijn (in office, 1933–1939). In April 
and May 1936, Colijn had a discussion with the British Minister in The Hague regarding the defence 
of the Indies. The report of this meeting was later relayed to the British cabinet. However, Dutch 
neutrality precluded the creation of a formal alliance. At that time, the importance of the Dutch East 
Indies to British defence arrangements in Southeast Asia and Australasia had been expressed in 
numerous war cabinet discussions in London. Any successful Japanese landings in Sumatra would 
clearly spell disaster for the British military base in Singapore. However, Britain did not want to give 
a guarantee to protect the Dutch East Indies if the Dutch themselves refused to make meaningful 
investments in the defence of their colony (Bussemaker 2000, 118). The newly attempted 
construction of the coastal defence of Java starting in 1936 was possibly an attempt, though a half-
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hearted one, to secure the necessary British military guarantees and an earnest of the Dutch willingness 
to prepare for war in the Indies. 
From the 1930s until the very eve of the Pacific War, there were several views within the Dutch 
government regarding the potential benefits of an Anglo-Dutch alliance in Asia. Prime Minister 
Colijn, a staunch anglophile, advocated a closer relationship with Britain and showed a willingness to 
relinquish the principle of neutrality. However, Colijn’s optimism that an Anglo-Dutch alliance 
would guarantee the security of the Dutch East Indies in case of war was not shared by many of his 
Dutch cabinet colleagues. The Minister of the Colonies, Charles Welter (in office, 1937–1939 and 
1939–1941)—who was directly responsible for the colonial administration and was tasked with 
articulating Dutch colonial policy—for example, was still in support of neutrality. Such conflicting 
cabinet opinions placed a heavy burden on the shoulders of the governor-general, who was caught 
between a rock and a hard place, seeing all too clearly the ever-present danger of Japanese attack at 
the same time as accepting the mother country’s neutral policy. Given this invidious situation, 
Governor-General Tjarda van Starkenborgh-Stachouwer (in office, 1936–1942) proceeded with great 
care. He secretly sent his military staff to audit the joint military meetings with the British—at which 
the US was also present, but usually just as observers (Bussemaker 2000, 121–23). In addition, he 
also gave approval for several mutual visits by British and Dutch staff officers to military bases in the 
Indies and in neighbouring British colonies. 
Such visits were carried out in deep secrecy to avoid Japan demanding the same reciprocal 
military inspection rights. Realistically, the Dutch East Indies colonial government had realised the 
importance of a formal coalition with Britain in dealing with Japan. However, many parties—
including the minister of the colonies, Welter—still clung to the principle of neutrality. The situation 
changed completely when Germany invaded and occupied the Netherlands in a lightning five-day 
campaign (blitzkrieg) (10–15 May 1940). The royal family and the Dutch cabinet fled to London 
and formed a government-in-exile. This utterly changed situation left the governor-general with the 
formidable task of maintaining the Dutch empire without support from the mother country. Perhaps 
because of his acute awareness of the parlous condition of the Royal Netherlands Indies armed forces 
(Koninklijk Nederlandsch Indisch Leger, KNIL)—which were almost completely unprepared to 
counter a foreign invasion—the governor-general took care not to provoke the Japanese and made it 
appear to Tokyo that he was still naively clinging to the principle of neutrality even after the fall of 
his home country, the Netherlands.  
Why did the Dutch attitude toward the Anglo-Dutch alliance seem so ambivalent? First, there 
was still confidence that Japan would abide by its promise in the Arita Declaration of 16 April 1940, 
which had stated that it would not attack the Dutch East Indies as long as the colony still maintained 
its neutrality. Secondly, the colonial government, especially Governor-General Tjarda, still awaited 
clarification regarding the United States’ attitude towards Japan. Thirdly, the Dutch East Indies still 
felt that it would be protected by the British defence screen in Singapore. Given that the British had 
a strategic interest in protecting their Bornean territories (Sabah and Sarawak), the main Japanese 
invasion route in any assault on the Indies, any Japanese plans for an amphibious strike through the 
South China Sea, appeared to be blocked. Singapore seemed so impregnable—at least to seaborne 
invasion—with its massive 15-inch coastal-defence batteries that there was general confidence that 
the British defence screen would never collapse. 
Dutch East Indies reliance on British protection was never actually formalised by any agreement 
or guarantee from the British side until the last days before Pearl Harbour. Although the Indies 
colonial press in the early 1940s assumed that the lack of military preparation by the Dutch colonial 
government indicated that the British had guaranteed the safety of the Indies, no such guarantee had 
been given either orally or in writing before the eve of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour (7–8 
December 1941). It was then that the joint defence agreement was struck at the eleventh hour on 5 
December 1941 (Bussemaker 2000, 135). In fact, the governor-general’s support for a policy of 
neutrality quickly changed following several high-level staff meetings in Singapore attended by senior 
military officers from the Dutch East Indies, Britain, and the US. These took place between October 
1940 and early 1941 and convinced the colonial government in Batavia that Britain would really 
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protect the Indies militarily. This emboldened the Dutch colonial authorities to take even stronger 
steps against Japan. In June 1941, the Japanese trade mission under Kenkichi Yoshizawa (1874–1965) 
was sent home empty-handed (Mook 1975, 96–100), and the following August, the Dutch East 
Indies government went a step further and joined the US in its oil embargo against Japan. But this 
was sheer bravado—when it came to taking practical steps for the defence of the Indies the Dutch 
colonial government was still woefully unprepared. Still convinced that their non-formal alliance with 
Britain and the US meant that these two allied powers would ensure their naval defence and close the 
northern maritime approaches to the archipelago, they comforted themselves with the conceit that 
the British in Singapore were more than capable of repelling a Japanese attack should it occur. 
Unexpectedly, Japan launched its invasion forces not frontally from the sea off Singapore but 
by amphibious landings in northern Malaya, striking at just after midnight on 8 December 1942 at 
Kota Bahru in northern Kelantan even before their Pearl Harbour operation had taken place. Two 
days later Japanese aircraft operating from their forward bases in Southern Indochina, destroyed 
Admiral Tom Phillips’ main naval squadron protecting the landing grounds, Force-Z, sinking both 
British battleships, the Prince of Wales and Repulse, within hours of each other on 10 December 
1941. The Japanese invasion force then took the land route through the Malay Peninsula positioning 
themselves to attack the British naval base in Singapore from the landward side via amphibious 
landings across the narrow strait separating Singapore island from Johor on the night of 8/9 February 
1942. By this time the island’s vital water reservoirs were in Japanese hands. The port city was then 
attacked at its weakest point—the forested northern coastline (Kurasawa 2016, 14).  
This military strategy was out of the box for the British. They had not foreseen it—all 
Singapore’s powerful naval guns pointed seawards and the British did not have the time or resources 
to prepare their ground defences on Singapore island in depth. The fact that the Japanese forces were 
led by one of imperial Japan’s most skilful field commanders, General Tomoyuki Yamashita (1885–
1946), the ‘Tiger of Malaya’, sealed their fate. After his lightning 70-day campaign through the jungles 
of Malaya, Yamashita launched a final ferocious onslaught from the air, sea, and land on Singapore—
the “impregnable fortress”—which finally fell on 15 February 1942. With the fall of the Malay 
Peninsula and Singapore, hopes of defending the Dutch East Indies against the Japanese vanished.  
At that point, the Indies were left to their own devises and were found woefully ill-prepared for 
an attack by a determined foreign foe. The joint Allied naval forces (American-British-Dutch-
Australian Command, ABDACOM) under Rear Admiral Karel Doorman (1889–1942) tasked with 
protecting Java from Japanese invasion was destroyed at the Battle of the Java Sea on 27 February 
1942. Ten days later, the entire Dutch East Indies armed forces surrendered unconditionally at the 
Kalijati Capitulation (8 March 1942) in the City of Subang after the emergency capital of the Dutch 
East Indies, Bandung, had been threatened with being bombed from the air by the Japanese air force 
(Bijkerk 1988, 303–4). The joint Allied forces ABDACOM then decided to move their defensive line 




In this whole story, it is evident that Britain and its naval defence played a critical determining role 
in the continuation of Dutch colonialism in Asia. After the British naval defeats at the hands of the 
Japanese on 10 December 1941 and the Battle of the Java Sea (27 February 1942) and the fall of the 
British military base in Singapore on 15 February 1942 the Dutch colonial state could not long 
survive. Its collapse was sudden and humiliating. But for the Indonesians it indirectly opened the 
opportunity for the birth of a new Indonesian state as Sutan Sjahrir (1909-66) clearly stated in his 
September 1945 pamphlet ‘our Struggle’ (Perdjoeangan Kita) (Sjahrir 1945). However, this kind of 
reliance on foreign naval power—post-war provided courtesy of the United States with the massive 
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